Moral Rights of Authors in the USA

Copyright 1998 by Ronald B. Standler

Table of Contents

introduction
contract law
view of U.S. Congress
case law in the USA
moral rights of authors rejected by courts in the USA



Introduction

In my essay on Copyright Law, I asserted that the USA does not recognize "moral rights" of authors that are included in article 6bis of the Berne Convention, despite the claim of the USA that it adheres to the Berne Convention. These moral rights include: The following moral rights are not mentioned in the Berne Convention, but are part of the national law in some countries: These moral rights of the author are perpetual, inalienable, and descend to the heirs of the author, even after the author transfers the economic rights (i.e., copyright) to another person or company. Articles 6, 19, 29 of French Law No.  57-298 of 11 March 1957; Article 6bis of Berne Convention. Moral rights arise from the French concept that a creative work contains the personality of its creator or author. Copyright is a property right, while the author's moral right is an extension of the author's character and personality. Personality is not transferable, which is why the author always retains the moral rights even after the author sells or transfers the copyright to another person or company.

Why are these rights important? In academia, as well as in many research laboratories, the hiring, promotion, and tenure decisions are made after considering the archival publications of the candidate. The awarding of grants or contracts for research are partly on the basis of the candidate's proposal, and partly on the basis of the reputation of the candidate's previously published works. Thus, a scientist's or professor's continued success is dependent on proper credit for his/her published work. Writing books, technical papers, and proposals is difficult work, that requires knowledge, skill, creativity, and diligence. There should not be an alternate route to achieving professional recognition.

There are many situations in which an author can be harmed: Recognition in law of the moral rights of authors would provide authors an important tool to fight such unjust behavior by others, who have an advantage in rank, power, or authority. However, it must be remembered that copyright, hence also moral rights of authors, only protects expression that is "fixed in any tangible medium of expression", not ideas. 17 U.S.C. §102. Berne Convention, Art. 2(2).



contract law

Some of these problems could be avoided by a carefully drafted contract. However, in reality, any written contract is likely to be drafted by the stronger party and offered to the weaker party as a Hobson's choice, without the opportunity for bargaining. Such contracts might later be attacked as an "adhesion contract". The essence of the problem in most of the above situations is that all of the power and control is in the hands of the stronger party, who is then in a position to abuse or exploit the weaker party. A written contract is unable to change this imbalance of power, or the consequences that flow from the exploitation of the weaker party.



view of U.S. Congress

During the passage of the Berne Convention Implementation Act, the U.S. Congress specifically stated in 1988 (Senate Report 100-352) that rights equivalent to moral rights of authors were already recognized in the USA under:
  1. the common law of misrepresentation and unfair competition,
  2. § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 USC § 1125(a)(1)(A), which prohibits "false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact" that is "likely to cause confusion, ... mistake," or deception about "the affiliation, connection, or association" of a person with any product or service.
  3. defamation (libel) law.
Therefore, Congress asserted that law in the USA already complied with 6bis in the Berne Convention, without any additions or changes to Copyright law in the USA.

17 USC § 104(c) specifically prohibits any person in the USA from relying on the protection of any right or interest specified in the Berne Convention, i.e., all rights in the USA must drive from statutes in the USA or common law in the USA.

In 1990, the U.S. Congress passed the Visual Artists Rights Act, 17 USC § 106A that specifically gave authors of visual art (e.g., painting, drawing, print, sculpture, still photographic image) the following rights of attribution: and the following rights of integrity:
If the law in the USA already adequately protected moral rights of authors, why was it necessary to add 17 USC § 106A, and why were the rights there limited only to visual art? The addition of § 106A in 1990 casts doubt on the assertion of the U.S. Congress in 1988 that moral rights were already adequately recognized in U.S. law.



case law in the USA

It is indeed possible to find a few reported cases in the USA that appear to give relief equivalent to moral rights of authors, but nearly all of the recent cases involve only motion pictures, gramophone recordings, and television programs.

For example, consider the following cases in chronological order:
  1. Clemens v. Belford, Clark & Co., 14 F. 728, 730-731 (C.C.N.D.Ill. 1883) (Clemens sued publisher for unauthorized reprinting of his works. Clemens had not copyrighted his works, so they were in the public domain and could be reprinted. Clemens asserted that the publisher had infringed his common law trademark, "Mark Twain", but the court rejected that legal theory. The following quotation is only dicta.)
    Undoubtedly an author has the right to restrain the publication of any of his literary work which he has never published or given to the public. So, too, an author of acquired reputation, and, perhaps a person who has not obtained any standing before the public as a writer, may restrain another from the publication of literary matter purporting to have been written by him, but which, in fact, was never so written. In other words, no person has the right to hold another out to the world as the author of literary matter which he never wrote .... Any other rule would permit writers of inferior merit to put their compositions before the public under names of writers of high standing and authority, thereby perpetrating a fraud not only on the writer whose name is used, but also on the public.
  2. Gershwin v. Ethical Pub. Co. Inc., 1 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1937)(magazine article falsely attributed to plaintiff, plaintiff recovered for libel).
  3. Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2dCir. 1952)(sale of abridged recordings breached contract). In dicta, the court said it was unlawful under the tort of unfair competition to present an abridged performance and describe it as the performer's work. Id. at 588. The concurring opinion contains the following survey of American law in 1952:
    I agree, of course, that, whether by way of contract or tort, plaintiff (absent his consent to the contrary) is entitled to prevention of the publication, as his, of a garbled version of his uncopyrighted product. This is not novel doctrine: Byron obtained an injunction from an English court restraining the publication of a book purporting to contain his poems only, but which included some not of his authorship. American courts, too, have enforced such a right. Those courts have also enjoined the use by another of the characteristics of an author of repute in such manner as to deceive buyers into erroneously believing that they were buying a work of that author. Those courts, moreover, have granted injunctive relief in these circumstances: An artist sells one of his works to the defendant who substantially changes it and then represents the altered material to the public as that artist's product. Whether the work is copyrighted or not, the established rule is that, even if the contract with the artist expressly authorizes reasonable modifications (e.g., where a novel or stage play is sold for adaptation as a movie), it is an actionable wrong to hold out the artist as author of a version which substantially departs from the original. Under the authorities, the defendant's conduct here, as my colleagues say, may also be considered a kind of 'unfair competition' or 'passing off.'
    Granz v. Harris 198 F.2d 585, 589 (2dCir. 1952)(Frank, J., concurring) [footnotes and citations omitted].
  4. Rich v. RCA Corp., 390 F.Supp. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (singer gets injunction against record company's use of current photograph of singer on jacket of re-release of old songs).
  5. Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14 (2dCir. 1976) (ABC television network enjoined from editing Monthy Python television program). The court found the right in 15 USC § 1125(a), and specifically found that U.S. Copyright law did not recognize moral rights of authors. Id. at 24, 26.
  6. Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602 (9thCir. 1981) (removal of actor's name from film credits was valid claim under Lanham Act).


moral rights of authors rejected by courts in the USA

As seen above, courts in the USA occasionally recognize rights equivalent to some moral rights of authors, and grant relief to an author. However courts in the USA have consistently avoided or condemned the concept of moral rights of authors, as demonstrated by the following quotations.


Plaintiff advances another theory which needs little discussion. It is predicated upon the contention that there is a distinction between the economic rights of an author capable of assignment and what are called 'moral rights' of the author, said to be those necessary for the protection of his honor and integrity. These so-called 'moral rights,' so we are informed, are recognized by the civil law of certain foreign countries. In support of this phase of his argument, plaintiff relied upon a work by Stephen P. Ladas entitled 'The International Protection of Literary and Artistic Property' (page 575, et seq.). It appears, however, that the author's discussion relied upon by plaintiff relates to the law of foreign countries. As to the United States, Ladas in the same work states (page 802): 'The conception of 'moral rights' of authors so fully recognized and developed in the civil law countries has not yet received acceptance in the law of the United States. No such right is referred to by legislation, court decision or writers.'

What plaintiff in reality seeks is a change in the law of this country to conform to that of certain other countries. We need not stop to inquire whether such a change, if desirable, is a matter for the legislative or judicial branch of the government; in any event, we are not disposed to make any new law in this respect.
Vargas v. Esquire, 164 F.2d 522, 526 (7thCir. 1947).


In an action by three composers in the Soviet Union to prevent their uncopyrighted compositions from being used in a movie with an anti-Soviet theme, the court denied the composers' motion for an injunction. Shostakovich v. 20th Century-Fox, 80 N.Y.S.2d 575, aff'd, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1949).
The wrong which is alleged here is the use of plaintiffs' music in a moving picture whose theme is objectionable to them in that it is unsympathetic to their political ideology. The logical development of this theory leads inexcapably [sic] to the Doctrine of Moral Right. There is no charge of distortion of the compositions nor any claim that they have not been faithfully reproduced. Conceivably, under the doctrine of Moral Right the court could in a proper case, prevent the use of a composition or work, in the public domain, in such a manner as would be violative of the author's rights. The application of the doctrine presents much difficulty however. With reference to that which is in the public domain there arises a conflict between the moral right and the well established rights of others to use such works. Clemens v. Belford Clark & Co., [14 F. 728 (1883)]. So, too, there arises the question of the norm by which the use of such work is to be tested to determine whether or not the author's moral right as an author has been violated. Is the standard to be good taste, artistic worth, political beliefs, moral concepts or what is it to be? In the present state of our law the very existence of the right is not clear, the relative position of the rights thereunder with reference to the rights of others is not defined nor has the nature of the proper remedy been determined. Quite obviously therefore, in the absence of any clear showing of the infliction of a wilful injury or of any invasion of a moral right, this court should not consider granting the drastic relief asked on either theory. The motion is accordingly denied in all respects.
Shostakovich, 80 N.Y.S.2d 575, 578-579 (1948).[one citation omitted]

The composers also sued in France, but won there. Soc. Le Chant de Monde v. Soc. Fox Europe et Soc. Fox Americane Twentieth Century, 1 Gazette du Palais 191 (13 Jan 1953), aff'd, D.A. Jur. 16, 80 Cour d'appel Paris.


Plaintiff, in asking for such relief, relied in part not on the contract but on the doctrine of artists' 'normal right,' a compendious label of a 'bundle of rights' enforced in many 'civil law' countries. Able legal thinkers, pointing out that American courts have already recognized a considerable number of the rights in that 'bundle,' have urged that our courts use the 'moral right' symbol. Those thinkers note that the label 'right of privacy' served to bring to the attention of our courts a common center of perspectives previously separated in the decisions, and that the use of that label induced further novel and valuable judicial perspectives.

To this suggestion there are these objections:
  1. 'Moral right' seems to indicate to some persons something not legal, something meta-legal.
  2. The 'moral right' doctrine, as applied in some countries, includes very extensive rights which courts in some American jurisdictions are not yet prepared to acknowledge; as a result, the phrase 'moral right' seems to have frightened some of those courts to such an extent that they have unduly narrowed artists' rights.
  3. Finally, it is not always an unmitigated boon to devise and employ such a common name.   ....
Granz v. Harris 198 F.2d 585, 590 (2dCir. 1952)(Frank, J., concurring) [footnotes and citations omitted](relief was granted on a contract theory).
Without rejecting the doctrine of 'moral right,' I think that, in the light of the foregoing, we should not rest decision on that doctrine where, as here, it is not necessary to do so.
Id. at 591.


Seroff v. Simon & Schuster, 162 N.Y.S.2d 770 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1957), aff'd, 210 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1960) (author could not hold publisher liable for damage to reputation from distorted translation of author's book).


There is apparently a right under continental law, which is similar to the 'property right' asserted by petitioner, the so-called 'moral right.' [citation deleted] This seems to encompass the right to prevent the 'distortion, mutilation or other alteration' of an author's work. See art. 6bis, §(1) of the Brussels Convention (1948) [a revision of Berne Convention]; and that right may pass to the heirs of the author in certain circumstances. See art. 6bis, §(2) of the Brussels Convention (1948). Whether it would permit the heirs of Glenn Miller to protect 'The Glenn Miller Story' is unclear. But, in any event, the moral right, as such, is not recognized in this country.
Miller v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 299 F.2d 706, 709 n.5 (2dCir. 1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 923 (1962).


But no jurisdiction has created the sort of moral right Weinstein invokes, let alone created any moral right through judicial decision. A federal court is not about to foist so novel a principle on Illinois. There is no reason to suspect that the courts of Illinois are just about to adopt an approach that no American jurisdiction follows as a general matter.
Weinstein v. University of Illinois, 811 F.2d 1091, 1095 (7thCir. 1987).


The copyright law of most countries of the world, recognizes a so-called "moral right" (droit moral) that protects authors from modification of their works in such a manner as to affect the artistic impression of the work. While the moral right doctrine as such has never been a part of United States copyright law, the case Edison v. Viva International, 70 A.D.2d 379, 421 N.Y.S.2d 203 (1st Dept.1979), implies that under certain circumstances an author's work may be entitled to protection.
Society of Survivors of the Riga Ghetto, Inc. v. Huttenbach, 535 N.Y.S.2d 670, 673-4 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1988).


If a joint work is marred by errors reflecting unfavorably on his coauthor, with quantifiable adverse effects on the coauthor's career, the coauthor might conceivably have some legal remedy, but it wouldn't be under the Copyright Act. We don't know what it would be under: possibly the law of contracts; in Europe it might be a violation of the author's "moral right" (droit moral), the right to the integrity of his work; and there are glimmers of the moral-rights doctrine in contemporary American copyright law.
Seshadri v. Kasraian, 130 F.3d 798, 803 (7thCir. 1997).


As these brief quotations make clear, the moral rights of authors of books and technical papers are essentially nonexistent in the USA. There are additional examples and analysis in Carol G. Ludolph and Gary E. Merenstein, Authors' Moral Rights in the U.S. and the Berne Convention, 19 Stetson Law Rev. 201 (1989); Edward J. Damich, Moral Rights in the United States ..., 10 Columbia-VLA J. Law & Arts 655 (1986); Russell J. DaSilva, Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright, 28 Bulletin of the Copyright Society 1 (1980).



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