Moral Rights of Authors in the USA
Copyright 1998 by Ronald B. Standler
Table of Contents
introduction
contract law
view of U.S. Congress
case law in the USA
moral rights of authors rejected by courts in the USA
Introduction
In my essay on Copyright Law,
I asserted that the USA does not recognize
"moral rights" of authors that are included in article 6bis
of the Berne Convention, despite the claim of the USA that it adheres
to the Berne Convention. These moral rights include:
- the right of integrity: mutilation or distortion that would
prejudice the author's honor or reputation is not permitted.
In French law, this right is called "droit au respect de l'oeuvre"
and is mentioned in Article 6 of the French Law No. 57-298
of 11 March 1957.
- the right of attribution: the true author has the right to have
his/her name on the work, and a non-authors are prevented from having
their names attached to the author's work.
In French law, this right is called "droit à la paternité"
and is mentioned in Article 6 of the French Law No. 57-298
of 11 March 1957.
The following moral rights are not mentioned in the Berne Convention,
but are part of the national law in some countries:
- the right of disclosure: the author has the final decision
on when and where to publish.
In French law, called "droit de divulgation".
and is mentioned in Article 19 of the French Law No. 57-298
of 11 March 1957. The publisher must not modify the author's work,
except with the author's written consent. Art. 56 of French Law No. 57-298.
- the right to withdraw or retract:when an author's views change,
the author may purchase at wholesale price all of the remaining
copies of the author's work, then prevent printing of more copies.
In French law, this right is called "droit de retrait ou de repentir"
and is mentioned in Article 32 of the French Law No. 57-298
of 11 March 1957.
- the right to reply to criticism: For example,
French law gives the author a right to reply to a critic and to
have the reply published in the same place as the critic's expression.
This law honors the doctrine of Justice Brandeis that the proper remedy
is "more speech".
These moral rights of the author are perpetual, inalienable, and
descend to the heirs of the author, even after the author
transfers the economic rights (i.e., copyright) to another person or company.
Articles 6, 19, 29 of French Law No. 57-298 of 11 March 1957;
Article 6bis of Berne Convention.
Moral rights arise from the French concept that a creative work
contains the personality of its creator or author. Copyright is a
property right, while the author's moral right is an extension of the
author's character and personality. Personality is not transferable,
which is why the author always retains the moral rights even after the
author sells or transfers the copyright to another person or company.
Why are these rights important? In academia, as well as in many research
laboratories, the hiring, promotion, and tenure decisions are made after
considering the archival publications of the candidate. The awarding
of grants or contracts for research are partly on the basis
of the candidate's proposal, and partly on the basis of the reputation
of the candidate's previously published works. Thus, a scientist's
or professor's continued success is dependent on proper credit for
his/her published work. Writing books, technical papers, and proposals
is difficult work, that requires knowledge, skill, creativity, and diligence.
There should not be an alternate route to achieving professional
recognition.
There are many situations in which an author can be harmed:
- A supervisor appropriates the work of a student or post-doctoral
associate and publishes the work with the name of the supervisor as
the sole author. The student or post-doctoral associate will be
reluctant to protest, because he/she needs letters of
recommendation from the supervisor.
- A supervisor adds his name to the work of a student, post-doctoral
associate, or technician who works in his laboratory, when the
supervisor contributed no ideas and no labor to the work.
- A student, post-doctoral associate, or junior scientist publishes
work that includes substantial contributions (e.g., novel ideas)
from a professor or supervisor, without the approval of the
professor or supervisor.
- If the professor's/supervisor's name appears on the publication,
the poor quality of the publication could be an embarrassment
to the professor or supervisor.
- If the professor's/supervisor's name does not appear on the publication,
then the professor/supervisor is denied credit for his/her novel ideas.
- An author submits a carefully prepared final draft, which contains
no typographical errors and no misspelt words. The editor and typesetter
at a journal or book publisher can make a shambles of the author's work,
by introducing errors in both grammar and content, substituting homonyms,
misspelling words, .... The published version can be an
embarrassment to the author.
- The publisher of a book, who owns the copyright in the text,
can authorize derivative works (e.g., translations, revised versions)
without the approval of the original author.
- If the original author's name appears on a bad derivative work,
that author will be embarrassed by the poor quality of the work.
- If the original author's name does not appear on a good derivative
work, that author receives no public recognition for his earlier work.
- A publisher can allow one of the original author's enemies to
use substantial amounts of the original author's work in a new book.
The result might be harmful to the original author's reputation.
- Professor makes depreciating or demeaning remarks about discoverer
(e.g., "student in my laboratory, girl in my laboratory, my technician").
Rank or job title should not affect credit given to a discoverer.
Recognition in law of the moral rights of authors would provide authors
an important tool to fight such unjust behavior by others, who have an
advantage in rank, power, or authority. However, it must be remembered
that copyright, hence also moral rights of authors, only protects
expression that is "fixed in any tangible medium of expression",
not ideas. 17 U.S.C. §102. Berne Convention, Art. 2(2).
contract law
Some of these problems could be avoided by a
carefully drafted contract. However, in reality, any written contract
is likely to be drafted by the stronger party and offered to the weaker
party as a Hobson's choice, without the opportunity for bargaining.
Such contracts might later be attacked as an "adhesion contract".
The essence of the problem in most of the above situations is that
all of the power and control is in the hands of the stronger party,
who is then in a position to abuse or exploit the weaker party.
A written contract is unable to change this imbalance of power,
or the consequences that flow from the exploitation of the weaker party.
view of U.S. Congress
During the passage of the Berne Convention Implementation Act, the
U.S. Congress specifically stated in 1988 (Senate Report 100-352)
that rights equivalent to moral rights of authors were already recognized
in the USA under:
- the common law of misrepresentation and unfair competition,
- § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 USC § 1125(a)(1)(A),
which prohibits "false designation of origin, false or
misleading description of fact" that is "likely to cause confusion, ...
mistake," or deception about "the affiliation, connection, or
association" of a person with any product or service.
- defamation (libel) law.
Therefore, Congress asserted that law in the USA already complied with
6bis in the Berne Convention, without any additions or changes to
Copyright law in the USA.
17 USC § 104(c) specifically prohibits any person in the USA from
relying on the protection of any right or interest specified in the
Berne Convention, i.e., all rights in the USA must drive from statutes
in the USA or common law in the USA.
In 1990, the U.S. Congress passed the Visual Artists Rights Act,
17 USC § 106A that specifically gave authors of visual art
(e.g., painting, drawing, print, sculpture, still photographic image)
the following rights of attribution:
- the right to claim authorship
- the right to prevent his/her name from being attached to works that
he/she did not create
- the right to prevent use of his/her name as the author after
mutilation, distortion, or other modification of the work that is
prejudicial to his/her honor or reputation
and the following rights of integrity:
- prevent any intentional mutilation or distortion of the work that
is prejudicial to his/her honor or reputation
- prevent destruction of a work of recognized stature
If the law in the USA already adequately protected moral rights of authors,
why was it necessary to add 17 USC § 106A, and why were the
rights there limited only to visual art?
The addition of § 106A in 1990 casts doubt on the assertion of the
U.S. Congress in 1988 that moral rights were already adequately
recognized in U.S. law.
case law in the USA
It is indeed possible to find a few reported cases in the USA that
appear to give relief equivalent to moral rights of authors, but nearly all
of the recent cases involve only motion pictures, gramophone recordings, and
television programs.
For example, consider the following cases in chronological order:
- Clemens v. Belford, Clark & Co., 14 F. 728, 730-731 (C.C.N.D.Ill. 1883)
(Clemens sued publisher for unauthorized reprinting of his works.
Clemens had not copyrighted his works, so they were in the public domain
and could be reprinted. Clemens asserted that the publisher had infringed
his common law trademark, "Mark Twain", but the court rejected that legal
theory. The following quotation is only dicta.)
- Undoubtedly an author has the right to restrain the publication of any
of his literary work which he has never published or given to the public.
So, too, an author of acquired reputation, and, perhaps a person who has
not obtained any standing before the public as a writer, may restrain
another from the publication of literary matter purporting to have been
written by him, but which, in fact, was never so written. In other words,
no person has the right to hold another out to the world as the author
of literary matter which he never wrote .... Any other rule would permit
writers of inferior merit to put their compositions before the public under
names of writers of high standing and authority, thereby perpetrating
a fraud not only on the writer whose name is used, but also on the public.
- Gershwin v. Ethical Pub. Co. Inc., 1 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1937)(magazine
article falsely attributed to plaintiff, plaintiff recovered for libel).
- Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2dCir. 1952)(sale of
abridged recordings breached contract). In dicta, the court
said it was unlawful under the tort of unfair competition to present
an abridged performance and describe it as the performer's work.
Id. at 588.
The concurring opinion contains the following survey of American law in 1952:
- I agree, of course, that, whether by way of contract or tort,
plaintiff (absent his consent to the contrary) is entitled to
prevention of the publication, as his, of a garbled version of his
uncopyrighted product. This is not novel doctrine: Byron obtained an
injunction from an English court restraining the publication of a book
purporting to contain his poems only, but which included some not of his
authorship. American courts, too, have enforced such a right.
Those courts have also enjoined the use by another of the characteristics
of an author of repute in such manner as to deceive buyers into erroneously
believing that they were buying a work of that author. Those courts, moreover,
have granted injunctive relief in these circumstances:
An artist sells one of his works to the defendant who
substantially changes it and then represents the altered material to
the public as that artist's product. Whether the work is copyrighted or not,
the established rule is that, even if the contract with the artist
expressly authorizes reasonable modifications (e.g., where a novel or stage
play is sold for adaptation as a movie), it is an actionable wrong to
hold out the artist as author of a version which substantially departs
from the original. Under the authorities, the defendant's conduct here,
as my colleagues say, may also be considered a kind of 'unfair competition'
or 'passing off.'
- Granz v. Harris 198 F.2d 585, 589 (2dCir. 1952)(Frank, J., concurring)
[footnotes and citations omitted].
- Rich v. RCA Corp., 390 F.Supp. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(singer gets injunction against record company's use of current
photograph of singer on jacket of re-release of old songs).
- Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14 (2dCir. 1976)
(ABC television network enjoined from editing Monthy Python television
program). The court found the right in 15 USC § 1125(a),
and specifically found that U.S. Copyright law did not recognize
moral rights of authors. Id. at 24, 26.
- Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602 (9thCir. 1981)
(removal of actor's name from film credits was valid claim under Lanham Act).
moral rights of authors rejected by courts in the USA
As seen above, courts in the USA occasionally recognize rights
equivalent to some moral rights of authors, and grant relief to an author.
However courts in the USA have consistently avoided or condemned the concept of
moral rights of authors, as demonstrated by the following quotations.
- Plaintiff advances another theory which needs little discussion. It is
predicated upon the contention that there is a distinction between the
economic rights of an author capable of assignment and what are called 'moral
rights' of the author, said to be those necessary for the protection of his
honor and integrity. These so-called 'moral rights,' so we are informed, are
recognized by the civil law of certain foreign countries. In support of this
phase of his argument, plaintiff relied upon a work by Stephen P. Ladas
entitled 'The International Protection of Literary and Artistic Property'
(page 575, et seq.). It appears, however, that the author's discussion relied
upon by plaintiff relates to the law of foreign countries. As to the United
States, Ladas in the same work states (page 802): 'The conception of 'moral
rights' of authors so fully recognized and developed in the civil law
countries has not yet received acceptance in the law of the United States.
No such right is referred to by legislation, court decision or writers.'
What plaintiff in reality seeks is a change in the law of this country to
conform to that of certain other countries. We need not stop to inquire
whether such a change, if desirable, is a matter for the legislative or
judicial branch of the government; in any event, we are not disposed to make
any new law in this respect.
Vargas v. Esquire, 164 F.2d 522, 526 (7thCir. 1947).
In an action by three composers in the Soviet Union to prevent their
uncopyrighted compositions from being used in a movie with an
anti-Soviet theme, the court denied the composers' motion for an injunction.
Shostakovich v. 20th Century-Fox, 80 N.Y.S.2d 575,
aff'd, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1949).
- The wrong which is alleged here is the use of plaintiffs' music in a moving
picture whose theme is objectionable to them in that it is unsympathetic to
their political ideology. The logical development of this theory leads
inexcapably [sic] to the Doctrine of Moral Right. There is no charge of distortion
of the compositions nor any claim that they have not been faithfully
reproduced. Conceivably, under the doctrine of Moral Right the court could in
a proper case, prevent the use of a composition or work, in the public domain,
in such a manner as would be violative of the author's rights. The
application of the doctrine presents much difficulty however. With reference
to that which is in the public domain there arises a conflict between the
moral right and the well established rights of others to use such works.
Clemens v. Belford Clark & Co., [14 F. 728 (1883)]. So, too, there arises
the question of the norm by which the use of such work is to be tested to
determine whether or not the author's moral right as an author has been
violated. Is the standard to be good taste, artistic worth, political
beliefs, moral concepts or what is it to be? In the present state of our law
the very existence of the right is not clear, the relative position of the
rights thereunder with reference to the rights of others is not defined nor
has the nature of the proper remedy been determined. Quite obviously
therefore, in the absence of any clear showing of the infliction of a wilful
injury or of any invasion of a moral right, this court should not consider
granting the drastic relief asked on either theory. The motion is
accordingly denied in all respects.
Shostakovich, 80 N.Y.S.2d 575, 578-579 (1948).[one citation omitted]
The composers also sued in France, but won there.
Soc. Le Chant de Monde v. Soc. Fox Europe et Soc. Fox Americane Twentieth
Century, 1 Gazette du Palais 191 (13 Jan 1953),
aff'd, D.A. Jur. 16, 80 Cour d'appel Paris.
- Plaintiff, in asking for such relief, relied in part not on the
contract but on the doctrine of artists' 'normal right,'
a compendious label of a 'bundle of rights' enforced in many 'civil law'
countries. Able legal thinkers, pointing out that American courts have
already recognized a considerable number of the rights in that 'bundle,'
have urged that our courts use the 'moral right' symbol. Those thinkers
note that the label 'right of privacy' served to bring to the attention
of our courts a common center of perspectives previously separated
in the decisions, and that the use of that label induced further novel
and valuable judicial perspectives.
To this suggestion there are these objections:
- 'Moral right' seems to indicate to some persons something not legal,
something meta-legal.
- The 'moral right' doctrine, as applied in some countries, includes very
extensive rights which courts in some American jurisdictions are not yet
prepared to acknowledge; as a result, the phrase 'moral right' seems to
have frightened some of those courts to such an extent that they have
unduly narrowed artists' rights.
- Finally, it is not always an unmitigated boon to devise and employ
such a common name. ....
- Granz v. Harris 198 F.2d 585, 590 (2dCir. 1952)(Frank, J., concurring)
[footnotes and citations omitted](relief was granted on a contract theory).
- Without rejecting the doctrine of 'moral right,' I think that, in
the light of the foregoing, we should not rest decision on that
doctrine where, as here, it is not necessary to do so.
Id. at 591.
Seroff v. Simon & Schuster, 162 N.Y.S.2d 770 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1957),
aff'd, 210 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1960)
(author could not hold publisher liable for damage to reputation
from distorted translation of author's book).
- There is apparently a right under continental law, which is similar to the
'property right' asserted by petitioner, the so-called 'moral right.'
[citation deleted] This seems to encompass the right to prevent the
'distortion, mutilation or other alteration' of an author's work. See art.
6bis, §(1) of the Brussels Convention (1948) [a revision of Berne Convention];
and that right may pass to the heirs of the author in certain
circumstances. See art. 6bis, §(2) of the Brussels Convention (1948).
Whether it would permit the heirs of Glenn Miller to protect 'The Glenn Miller
Story' is unclear. But, in any event, the moral right, as such, is not
recognized in this country.
Miller v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
299 F.2d 706, 709 n.5 (2dCir. 1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 923 (1962).
- But no jurisdiction has created the sort of moral right Weinstein
invokes, let alone created any moral right through judicial decision.
A federal court is not about to foist so novel a principle on Illinois.
There is no reason to suspect that the courts of Illinois are just about
to adopt an approach that no American jurisdiction follows as a general matter.
Weinstein v. University of Illinois, 811 F.2d 1091, 1095 (7thCir. 1987).
- The copyright law of most countries of the world, recognizes a so-called
"moral right" (droit moral) that protects authors from modification of their
works in such a manner as to affect the artistic impression of the work.
While the moral right doctrine as such has never been a part
of United States copyright law, the case Edison v. Viva International,
70 A.D.2d 379, 421 N.Y.S.2d 203 (1st Dept.1979), implies that under certain
circumstances an author's work may be entitled to protection.
Society of Survivors of the Riga Ghetto, Inc. v. Huttenbach,
535 N.Y.S.2d 670, 673-4 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1988).
- If a joint work is marred by errors reflecting unfavorably on his coauthor,
with quantifiable adverse effects on the coauthor's career, the coauthor
might conceivably have some legal remedy, but it wouldn't be under the
Copyright Act. We don't know what it would be under:
possibly the law of contracts; in Europe it might be a violation of the
author's "moral right" (droit moral), the right to the integrity of his work;
and there are glimmers of the moral-rights doctrine in contemporary American
copyright law.
Seshadri v. Kasraian, 130 F.3d 798, 803 (7thCir. 1997).
As these brief quotations make clear, the moral rights of authors of books
and technical papers are essentially nonexistent in the USA.
There are additional examples and analysis in
Carol G. Ludolph and Gary E. Merenstein,
Authors' Moral Rights in the U.S. and the Berne Convention,
19 Stetson Law Rev. 201 (1989); Edward J. Damich,
Moral Rights in the United States ..., 10 Columbia-VLA
J. Law & Arts 655 (1986); Russell J. DaSilva, Droit Moral and the
Amoral Copyright, 28 Bulletin of the Copyright Society 1 (1980).
created 5 April 1998, modified 29 May 1998
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